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Abstract: This paper empirically examines the effect of the use of credit scoring by large banking organizations
on small business lending in low- and moderate-income (LMI) areas. Using census tract level data for the
southeastern United States, the authors estimate that credit scoring increases small business lending by $16.4
million per LMI area served. Furthermore, this effect is almost 2.5 times larger than that estimated for higher
income census tracts ($6.8 million). The authors also find that credit scoring increases the probability that a
large banking organization will make small business loans in a given census tract. The change in this probability
is 3.8 percent for LMI areas and 1.7 percent for higher income areas. These findings suggest that credit scoring
reduces asymmetric information problems for borrowers and lenders and that this is particularly important
for LMI areas, which lenders may have historically bypassed because of their questionable economic health.
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I.  Introduction
Over the past decade, advances in information technology have transformed our society.
Indeed, macroeconomists have marveled at the increases in productivity and wealth creation
coupled with an absence of significant inflationary pressures, while microeconomists have noted
the attendant consumer benefits derived from many lower priced products and services.
Nevertheless, there has been little discussion of how the benefits of this improved technology are
distributed along demographic lines, such as income.
This paper provides empirical evidence on whether households and firms operating in
low- and moderate-income (LMI) areas have benefited from the adoption of a single new
technology: credit-underwriting software (i.e., credit scoring) designed to evaluate small
business loan applications. Credit scoring models have revolutionized lending by directly feeding
credit reporting agency data into statistical models that predict the probability of borrower
default.  Consequently, under this approach, loans are processed quicker and loan officers play a
diminished role in the decision-making process.
Specifically, we examine the net effect of the use of small business credit scoring models
by large banking organizations in funding firms located in LMI areas.  Furthermore, we compare
this effect to that experienced by middle- and high-income (MHI) areas in order to discern its
relative magnitude.  This study is important not only because it examines whether LMI areas
benefit from the adoption of new technologies, but also because it focuses on the provision of
credit – one of the primary components of any policy proposal for creating economic opportunity
in traditionally under-served areas.2
  The rest of our paper is organized in the following manner.  Sections II presents
background information on small business credit markets and credit scoring with a particular
focus on LMI areas.  Section III discusses the four types of data used in this study.  Section IV
outlines our hypothesis tests and provides sample statistics.  Regression results and conclusions
are presented in Sections V and VI, respectively.
II. Small Business Lending, Credit Scoring, and LMI Areas
Theories concerning small business credit markets emphasize the existence of significant
information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders (Nakamura, 1993).  It is also believed
that such market imperfections can result in credit rationing by lenders, particularly when loans
are unsecured (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).  To mitigate such problems, borrowers and lenders
have historically used long-term relationships, or close and continuous interactions that generate
useful information about the borrowers’ financial states (Frame, 1994).  Moreover, small
businesses are thought to be dependent on local banks for such relationship-based borrowing.
Empirical evidence confirms both the value of lending relationships (Petersen and Rajan, 1994;
Berger and Udell, 1995; and Cole, 1998) as well as the use of local commercial banks for small
business credits (Elliehausen and Wolken, 1990).
In the wake of unprecedented consolidation of the U.S. commercial banking industry
during the 1990’s, many policymakers have expressed concern that the emerging institutions
may significantly reduce the availability of credit to small firms.  This conjecture is based
primarily on the fact that bank call report data indicate that small banks hold a greater percentage
of their assets in small business loans than do large banks (Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise, 1995).3
Indeed, Berger and Udell (1996) synthesize two theories positing that the provision of banking
services to small businesses decreases with bank size and organizational complexity.  The first is
that the small business lending is fundamentally different from large firm lending in that the
former credits are more information intensive and relationship-driven.  The second, based on the
work of Williamson (1967), emphasizes managerial diseconomies of scale with the provision of
multiple activities in large, complex organizations.
1  Berger and Udell’s empirical tests indicate
that large banks tend to charge relatively lower loan rates to and less often require collateral of
small business borrowers.  However, they find that large banks reduce their volume of relatively
costly relationship loans via price or quantity rationing.  Related work by Cole, Goldberg, and
White (1998) indicates that large banks typically employ standard financial statement criteria in
the loan decision process, while small banks focus more on their impression of borrower
character.
The aforementioned research suggests that small business loan underwriting is conducted
differently in large and small banks.  Today, in fact, most large banks use automated
underwriting systems for small business lending based upon credit scores.  Credit scoring is the
process of assigning a single quantitative measure, or score, to a potential borrower representing
an estimate of the borrower’s future loan performance (Feldman, 1997).  While credit scores
have been used for some time in the underwriting of consumer loans, this technology has only
recently been routinely applied to commercial credits.  This is because commercial loans were
thought to be too heterogeneous and that documentation was not standardized either within or
across institutions (Rutherford 1994/1995).  However, credit analysts ultimately determined that
                                                
1 For example, the trend toward large banking organizations with expanded product lines and increased geographic
dispersion may complicate the managerial structure of the banking organization.  This can result in increased layers
of management (vertical complexity) and an increased number of parallel functions (horizontal complexity.)4
the personal credit history of small business owners is highly predictive of the loan repayment
prospects of the business, especially for loans under $100,000.
2  Thus, personal information is
obtained from a credit bureau and then augmented with basic business-specific data to predict
repayment.  Eisenbeis (1996) presents an excellent overview of the history and application of
credit scoring techniques to small business loan portfolios.
According to Feldman (1997), credit scoring will alter small business lending in three
areas:  (1) the interaction between borrowers and lenders; (2) loan pricing; and (3) credit
availability.  First, credit scoring allows lenders to underwrite and monitor loans without actually
meeting the borrower.  This development is in stark contrast to the perceived importance of a
local bank-borrower relationship.  In fact, because of scoring systems, borrowers can obtain
unsecured credit from distant lenders through direct marketing channels.  Second, the price of
small business loans should decline -- especially for high credit quality borrowers that will no
longer will have to bear the cost of extensive underwriting.  Also, increased competition --
resulting from small businesses having access to more lenders -- should further lower borrowing
costs.  Third, credit scoring should increase credit availability for small businesses.  Better
information about the repayment prospects of a small business applicant makes it more likely
that a lender will price the loan based on expected risk, rather than denying the loan out of fear of
charging too little.  Moreover, the widespread use of credit scoring should increase future
prospects for asset securitization by encouraging consistent underwriting standards.
Empirical evidence concerning Feldman’s predictions is limited to the effect of credit
scoring on small business credit availability.  Indeed, Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley (2001)
                                                
2 Mester (1997) cites the use of information such as the applicant’s monthly income, outstanding debt, financial
assets, employment tenure, home ownership, and previous loan defaults or delinquencies.5
estimate that the use of credit scoring increases the portfolio share of small business loans by 8.4
percent for their sample of large commercial banking organizations.  Of course, in light of the
findings of Berger and Udell (1996) and Cole, et. al. (1998), this increase in lending likely
represents a combination of new business offset somewhat by a decline in relationship-based
loans by large banks.
While the principles outlined above apply uniformly to small business credit markets,
those geographic areas characterized by a large concentration of LMI households may be
affected in additional ways.  First, due to asymmetric information problems, banks may have
historically elected to more readily ration small business credit in LMI areas due to their
questionable economic health.  That is, lenders may have “redlined,” or used the physical
location of the business as a crude proxy for the riskiness of the loan.  Credit scoring, by
reducing these informational asymmetries, should serve to reduce redlining and further increase
the flow of small business loans in LMI areas.  Second, credit scores are designed to be objective
risk measures that may significantly reduce the willingness and ability of a loan officer to
discriminate based upon the borrower’s race.
3  This is particularly important in LMI areas in
which minority groups are generally over-represented.  Thus, we expect increased objectivity to
increase credit availability in LMI areas.  Third, credit scoring models may not accurately
measure the probability of loan repayment for LMI borrowers if the population of loans used to
build the model was not sufficiently diverse.  This could either help or hinder small business
credit availability in LMI areas depending upon whether the model parameters are valid for the
LMI sub-population.
                                                
3 Ladd (1998) reviews both the theoretical motives and empirical evidence of racial discrimination in lending.6
III. Data
To examine the effect of credit scoring on small business lending in LMI areas, we focus
on the lending patterns of a sample of large banking organizations in each census tract in the
southeastern United States (Southeast).  We define the Southeast as those states located in the
Sixth Federal Reserve district: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Tennessee.  We limit our analysis in this way for two reasons.  First, we examine large banking
organizations because they are much more likely to use credit scoring for small business lending
than smaller institutions.  This is due to the high start-up costs both in terms of purchasing
software and training personnel to operate the system.  Second, we employ regional analysis
exclusively for computational convenience.  We have no reason to believe that our results could
not be generalized nationwide.
Overall, we use four different types of data in our analysis: (1) demographic data for each
census tract; (2) business information for each census tract; (3) bank data at both the census tract
and institutional levels; and (4) survey data on the use of credit scoring by large banking
organizations.  We then combine these data to uncover the determinants of small business
lending activity by large banking organizations in each census tract in the Southeast.
First, using the Census Bureau’s LandView III software, we collected the median
household income and the racial characteristics for each census tract in the Southeast.  We
examined median household income for each census tract relative to either its Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA) for urban census tracts or total non-metropolitan area of its state for rural
census tracts.  That is, each census tract is denoted as either “low-income,” “moderate-income,”
“middle-income,” or “high income” based on its median income as a percent of broader area7
(MSA or state) median income.
4  The latter data were obtained from SNL Securities’ SNL
DataSource.  Table 1 presents the number and percent of rural and urban census tracts assigned
to the income classifications for southeastern census tracts.
[Table 1 about here.]
Second, we collected information on the total number of businesses in each census tract
sorted by total annual revenues from Dun and Bradstreet.  We then estimated total small business
revenues in each census tract as the sum of the product of the number of businesses in each
revenue category multiplied by the median revenue specified by each category.
5  Unfortunately,
because the Dun and Bradstreet data do not cover all census tracts, we had to drop 83 from our
analysis (1.1 percent).
6
Third, we used several sources to extract data for our sample of 99 large banking
organizations.  Data on the total dollar value of small business loans originated in 1997 in each
census tract in the Southeast, by bank, are collected from the CRA small business lending
database.  This database, prepared by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, provides total
commercial loan originations of less than $1 million, by reporting institution, for each census
                                                
4 Following Bostic and Canner (1998), we define “low-income” communities as ones with median household
income less than 50 percent of their larger areas’.  “Moderate-income” means that median household income that is
at least 50 percent but less than 80 percent of the broader area.  “Middle-income” denotes median household income
is between 80 percent and 120 percent of the area’s median household income.  “High income” means median
household income is greater than 120 percent of the area’s median household income.
5 For example, consider a census tract where there are two businesses with revenues less than $50,000, two with
revenues between $50,000 and $100,000, and one business with revenues between $100,000 and $250,000.  We
estimate total small business revenue to be $375,000 = (2 * $25,000) + (2 * $75,000) + (1 * $175,000) .
6 Of these, 23 were low- or moderate-income and 60 were middle- or high-income.  Further, 22 were urban census
tracts and 61 were rural.8
tract in the United States.
7, 8 For reasons discussed below, we confine our analysis to those loans
with original amounts less than $100,000.  We also collected aggregate information for each
banking organization, such as total assets, total equity, and total small loans to businesses from
the bank call reports.  The FDIC’s Summary of Deposits data provided information on specific
bank branch locations.
Lastly, we use data from a telephone survey of the 200 largest U.S. banking organizations
(as measured by total domestic banking assets as of June 30, 1997).
9  The Federal Reserve Bank
of Atlanta conducted this survey of small business credit scoring in January 1998.  Some 99
institutions responded to the telephone survey, of which 61 reported credit scoring small business
loans under $100,000 for most of 1997.  Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley (2001) provide a
complete discussion of the small business credit scoring survey and responses.
The large banking organizations examined in this study are exclusively those that
responded to the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s telephone survey.  Each of these institutions
report small business lending information under the CRA.  Indeed, 77 of the respondents (77.8
percent) had originated small business loans in the Southeast in 1997.  This figure includes 50
institutions that reported using credit scoring (82.0 percent of scorers) and 27 that did not (71.1
percent of non-scorers).
                                                
7 The data are filed with the Federal Reserve Board of Governors regardless of a reporting bank’s primary regulator.
This information is required under an interagency revision of Community Reinvestment Act regulations by the
federal bank and thrift regulators in 1995.  Individual bank disclosures and aggregated data are publicly available at
www.ffiec.gov/cra.
8 Technically, this data represents “small loans to businesses,” rather than small business loans.  Nevertheless, as
noted by Bostic and Canner (1998), because small businesses are more likely than larger ones to borrow small
amounts, the CRA data (like the similar Call Report data) on small loans are likely to provide a reasonable measure
of the extension of credit to small businesses.  See Bostic and Canner (1998) for a complete discussion of the CRA
small business lending database – including some potential limitations for conducting policy research and analysis.9
IV.  Hypothesis Testing
Based on the discussion in Section II, we believe that credit scoring will have an overall
positive effect on small business credit availability in LMI areas and that this effect may be
larger than that for MHI areas.  This would primarily result from lenders facing lower fixed
underwriting costs, reducing their use of proxies (e.g., borrower location) for individual
creditworthiness, and having increased objectivity.  However, credit scoring models may also
effect credit availability (either positively or negatively) if the data used to estimate them is not
representative of LMI borrowers.  Moreover, credit scoring may result in the rationing of some
“relationship-based” loans away from large banks.  Unfortunately, our analysis cannot
distinguish among these individual effects, but rather captures the net effect.
The dependent variable in our empirical model is the total dollar volume of small
business loans under $100,000 in each census tract (SBL) in the Southeast for each banking
organization that responded to our telephone survey.  SBL is scaled by $1 million.  We then
model SBL as a function of whether the banking organization uses credit scoring (SCORE) as
well as several other variables accounting for variation between banking organizations and
census tracts.  We now discuss each independent variable, in turn, according to its predicted
effect on the supply of or demand for small business loans.
We include three variables in our empirical model designed to capture each banking
organization’s propensity to supply a certain level of small business credit.  Each of these
variables was constructed from bank Call Report data aggregated to the bank holding company
level.  First, we include institution size as defined as the natural logarithm of total domestic
banking assets (LNASSETS).  This variable is included to capture the fact that larger banking
                                                                                                                                                            
9 The sample was further limited to exclude credit card banks and institutions with less than 0.50 percent of their
total assets in small business loans.  These exclusions reduced the sample size to 190.10
organizations will tend to underwrite more loans in any single census tract, but that this effect
diminishes as size increases due to demand constraints.  Second, we include the banking
organization’s overall ratio of small business loans to total domestic banking assets
(SBLRATIO).  This variable is included to account for variation between institutions in their
propensity to make small business loans.  That is, some banks may have more of an “institutional
focus” on small business lending than others.  Third, we include the banking organization’s
overall leverage ratio as defined as the ratio of total equity to total assets (LEVERAGE).  We
expect this variable to be positively related to the volume of small business loans because of the
risks associated with this type of lending.
Our empirical model also includes several variables that may affect the demand for small
business credit in each census tract.  First, we include a dummy variable (RURAL) that takes a
value of one for rural census tracts.  To the extent that present and future investment
opportunities are lower in rural areas, we expect this variable to be negative.  Second, we include
median household income (HHINCOME).  Because small business credit scoring models rely so
heavily on the financial position of the principal, we expect this to be positively related to the
level of lending.  Lastly, we include total small business revenues in each census tract
(SMALLBUSREV), with small businesses defined as all firms with total revenues below $1
million.  We expect the equilibrium level of small business lending to be positively related to
SMALLBUSREV, as greater business revenue may represent increased capacity to take on debt.
We also include three variables indicating the racial characteristics of the census tracts:
the percent of individuals identified as Hispanic (HISPANIC), the percent of individuals
identified as Asian (ASIAN), and the percent of individuals identified as black (BLACK).  These
variables may have either demand-side or supply-side interpretations.  A supply-side relationship11
between these race variables and small business lending (after controlling for other relevant
factors) could be interpreted as discrimination in the form of geographic “redlining” (if the effect
is negative) or policy intervention through effective enforcement of the Community
Reinvestment Act (if the effect is positive).  On the demand side, one might conjecture that, as a
cultural matter, some minority groups are less comfortable seeking bank credit.  This would be
indicated by a negative relationship between any of the race variables and SBL.
Two binary variables related to the geographic location of the bank may also have
demand-side or supply-side interpretations.  The first is whether the banking organization has a
bank branch located in the census tract (TRACTBRANCH).  The second indicates whether the
banking organization has a bank branch located in the relevant geographic banking market
(county or MSA depending on whether the census tract is located in a rural or urban area), but
outside the census tract (MKTBRANCH).  While we expect a positive relationship between
these variables and the volume of small business loans in the census tract, this finding may stem
from either the customer’s geographic convenience (demand-side) or better knowledge or
comfort level with lending in the local area by the bank (supply-side).
Tables 2 and 3 provide the sample statistics for all LMI and MHI census tracts in the
Southeast, respectively.  Sample statistics on the banking organization-specific variables,
SCORE, LNASSETS, SBLRATIO, and LEVERAGE are identical for our two samples.  As
mentioned earlier, 61 of the 99 (62 percent) institutions responding to the telephone survey used
credit scoring for small business loans for most of 1997.  Also, on average, the 99 large banking
organizations committed 2.4 percent of their portfolios to small business loans and had an
average leverage ratio of 8.4 percent.12
By examining the census-tract specific information, we can detect the important
differences between the LMI and MHI samples.  For the 99 large banking organizations, we find
that the average amount of small business lending in LMI areas in 1997 was $2.8 million,
compared with $3.6 million in MHI areas.  The large banking organizations also, on average,
have roughly the same branch presence in LMI census tracts as in MHI areas.  Turning to the
demographic information, we find that rural census tracts comprise about 22 percent of our LMI
sample and 32 percent of our MHI sample.  Average small business revenues were slightly
higher in MHI census tracts ($75.5 million) than LMI census tracts ($69.8 million).  The racial
characteristics of the LMI and MHI areas were similar, on average, for both Hispanics (4.3
percent and 3.7 percent, respectively) and Asians (0.7 percent and 0.9 percent, respectively).
However, the average percent of black residents in LMI areas was 50.3 percent versus 14.1
percent in MHI areas.
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here.]
Ultimately, we specify the following cross-sectional relationship between small business
lending in each census tracts and the demographic and bank characteristics described above:
(1) SBL = f(SCORE, LNASSETS, SBLRATIO, LEVERAGE, RURAL, HHINCOME, SMALLBUSREV,
HISPANIC, ASIAN, BLACK, TRACTBRANCH, MKTBRANCH)
Because most of the large banking organizations in our sample do not report small
business loans in every census tract under study, the dependent variable in equation (1) is often
coded with zero.  Due to this censoring, we estimate the statistical model using the Tobit13
procedure.  This is done for both the LMI and MHI groups.  The regression results are discussed
in the next section.
V.  Regression Results
Table 4 provides the Tobit estimates for our censored regression of census-tract-level
small business lending for both the LMI and MHI sub-groups.  In both cases, we find that credit
scoring is associated with increased small business lending activity by large banking
organizations.  Similarly, banking organization size, net worth, institutional focus on the small
business lending segment, and local branches were also positively related to the level of small
business lending in both LMI and MHI areas.  Rural areas and those with higher small business
revenues also had more small business lending.  Census tracts with a greater proportion of black
residents were associated with lower levels of small business lending by large banking
organizations in both LMI and MHI areas.  Small business credit availability is positively related
to household income only in MHI areas, but statistically unrelated in LMI areas.  This may
reflect the fact that there is much greater household income variation in the LMI sample versus
the MHI sample.
10
While the parameter estimates presented in Table 4 are useful for discussions of
statistical significance, the data censoring hinders economic interpretations and comparisons
across samples.  Thus, we calculate “marginal effects” for each independent variable evaluated at
their respective sample means (Greene 1997).  Specifically, we use a decomposition developed
by McDonald and Moffitt (1980) to uncover the predicted change in small business lending in
census tracts due to credit scoring, conditional on a large banking organization making loans
there.  This decomposition also allows us to estimate the change in the probability of lending in a14
particular census tract stemming from the use of credit scoring.  Formally, McDonald and
Moffitt’s decomposition can be expressed as:
(2) ∂ Ey / ∂ Xi = F(z) [∂ Ey* / ∂ Xi] + Ey* [∂ F(z) / ∂ Xi],
where Ey is the expected value of the unobserved (latent) dependent variable, Ey* is the
expected value of the observed dependent variable, X is a matrix of i=1,...,N independent
variables, and F(z) is the cumulative normal distribution function for a standardized random
variable, z = Xβ  / σ .  As noted by McDonald and Moffitt (1980), the total change in the
dependent variable arising from a change in the independent variables, ∂ Ey / ∂ Xi, can be
disaggregated into two parts.  The first is the change in y of those observations above the limit
(i.e., uncensored), weighted by the probability of being above the limit.  The second is the
change in the probability of being above the limit (e.g., zero), weighted by the expected value of
y if above the limit.  We focus our attention on two terms: (1) ∂ Ey* / ∂ Xi, or the average change
in the dependent variable given a change in the independent variables and that y>0; and (2) ∂ F(z)
/ ∂ Xi, or the change in the probability of observing y>0 given a change in the independent
variables.
Tables 5 and 6 present the total estimated marginal effects (∂ Ey / ∂ Xi) and decomposition
for the Tobit estimates of equation (1).  To begin, we estimate that credit scoring increases small
business lending by $16.4 million in LMI census tracts and $6.8 million in MHI tracts for our
sample of large banking organizations operating in the Southeast.  Credit scoring also increases
the probability of large banking organizations making small business loans in these census tracts
                                                                                                                                                            
10 .  This is reflected by the standard deviations of HHINCOME reported in Tables 2 and 3.15
by 3.8 percent and 1.7 percent, respectively.  These findings are consistent with reduced credit
rationing in LMI areas due to significantly improved information about borrower
creditworthiness.  As a result, banks are likely becoming much less inclined to use geographic
location or neighborhood racial characteristics as a proxy for borrower creditworthiness.
Overall, this demonstrates considerable benefits to LMI areas from a technological improvement
that is important to future economic development.
Examining the banking organization variables, the marginal effects for LNASSETS and
SBLRATIO are roughly the same across samples.  However, higher capitalization appears to be
more important for lending in LMI areas – perhaps due to risk considerations.  The presence of
branches in either the census tract or banking market (outside of the census tract) are strongly
positively related to small business lending for both the LMI and MHI samples.  For the LMI
sample, census tract branches ($360 million) appear to be more economically important than
branches otherwise located within the banking market ($292 million).  Moreover, the effect of
branching seems to have a marginally greater impact in LMI areas.  These results reflect the
strong local connections between the banks and their borrowers.
With respect to the census tract variables, we find that rural census tracts and those with
greater small business revenues receive larger credit volumes.  For example, we estimate that
rural areas within the LMI sample receive an extra $43.4 million in small business credit than
their urban counterparts.  This estimate is $29.3 million for MHI areas.  The effect of ethnicity
on small business lending appears generally to be small.  For LMI and MHI census tracts, the
proportion of Hispanic and Asian residents has no statistical relationship (at the 90 percent level)
with the volume of small business lending in a community.  Also, while the proportion of black
residents is negative and statistically related to small business lending for both LMI and MHI16
census tracts, the effect of this proportion (consistent across samples at about 0.19) is
economically unimportant.  It means that for every unit increase in the percent black of a census
tract’s population, small business lending is about $1,900 lower.  Furthermore, none of the race
variables had a material influence on the probability of large banking organizations making small
business loans in either LMI or MHI census tracts.
VI.  Conclusions
This paper empirically examined the effect of credit scoring on small business lending in
low- and moderate-income (LMI) areas.  Specifically, our analysis focused on lending activity of
99 large banking organizations in the southeastern United States as of year-end 1997.  Overall,
we estimate that credit scoring increases small business lending in LMI census tracts by $16.4
million per institution per census tract in which they underwrite loans.  This effect is about 2.5
times larger than that estimated for higher income census tracts.  The use of credit scoring also
increases the probability that a large banking organization will make loans in a census tract.  For
LMI areas, the probability increases by 3.8 percent and for MHI areas 1.7 percent.
Relationships between our other variables of interest and small business lending were
fairly consistent for LMI and MHI census tracts.  First, for the large banking organizations, their
size, institutional focus on small business lending, capitalization, and local branching were all
positively related to small business lending in all areas.  Second, for census tract demographics,
rural areas and those with greater small business revenues attract more capital.  Third, the effect
of ethnicity on small business lending is very small.  Indeed, while census tracts with larger
proportions of black residents have statistically smaller levels of small business lending, the
amount ($1,900) is economically unimportant.17
Our analysis suggests that credit scoring is increasing small business lending by reducing
asymmetric information problems between borrowers and lenders.  This effect appears to be
particularly pronounced and important for LMI areas, which historically have had difficulty
attracting capital.  Overall, these results suggest that low-income areas do benefit from
technological enhancements – and that sometimes these benefits are greater than those
experienced in higher income areas.18
Table 1
Number of Rural and Urban Census Tracts in the Southeastern United States













Low Income 46 7.42 574 92.58 620 100.00
Moderate Income 441 28.20 1123 71.80 1564 100.00
MiddleIncome 1406 38.11 2283 61.89 3689 100.00
High Income 399 22.18 1400 77.82 1799 100.00
Total 2292 29.87 5380 70.13 7672 100.0019
Table 2
Summary Statistics
Low- and Moderate Income Census Tracts
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
SBL 2.7510 56.5132 0.0000 18,452.00
SCORE 0.6163 0.4863 0.000 1.0000
LNASSETS 16.3007 1.3238 14.1778 19.6792
SBLRATIO 0.0240 0.0183 0.0019 0.1055
LEVERAGE 0.0844 0.0169 0.0535 0.1510
RURAL 0.2193 0.4137 0.0000 1.0000
HHINCOME 15,167.97 4,951.21 4,999.00 28,726.00
SMALLBUSREV 69.8154 96.1807 0.0250 1,590.23
HISPANIC 0.0425 0.1261 0.0000 0.9620
ASIAN 0.0074 0.0219 0.0000 0.4457
BLACK 0.5038 0.3453 0.0000 0.9994
TRACTBRANCH 0.0060 0.7691 0.0000 1.0000
MKTBRANCH 0.0599 0.2372 0.0000 1.0000
Table 3
Summary Statistics
Middle- and High-Income Census Tracts
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
SBL 3.6337 56.9998 0.0000 14,168.00
SCORE 0.6164 0.4863 0.000 1.0000
LNASSETS 16.3011 1.3240 14.1778 19.6792
SBLRATIO 0.0240 0.0183 0.0019 0.1055
LEVERAGE 0.0844 0.0169 0.0535 0.1510
RURAL 0.3235 0.4678 0.0000 1.0000
HHINCOME 29,655.25 11,330.45 14,133.00 150,001.00
SMALLBUSREV 75.5140 138.5568 0.0250 6,536.13
HISPANIC 0.0371 0.0956 0.0000 0.9224
ASIAN 0.0085 0.0115 0.0000 0.2183
BLACK 0.1405 0.1841 0.0000 0.9986
TRACTBRANCH 0.0078 0.0882 0.0000 1.0000
MKTBRANCH 0.0542 0.4678 0.0000 1.000020
Table 4
Parameter Estimates for LMI and MHI Census Tracts
Estimation by Tobit




























Chi-squared statistics in parentheses
* Indicates statistical significance at the 99 percent level.21
Table 5
McDonald and Moffitt Decomposition of Marginal Effects for
Small Business Lending in LMI Areas
∂ Ey / ∂ Xi = F(z) [∂ Ey* / ∂ Xi] + Ey* [∂ F(z) / ∂ Xi]
Marginal Effect Decomposition
Variable ∂ Ey / ∂ Xi F(z) [∂ Ey* / ∂ Xi] Ey* [∂ F(z) / ∂ Xi]
SCORE 22.8514 0.5236 16.4310 372.6045 0.0382
LNASSETS 115.2439 1.0000 115.2088 1878.4907 0.0000
SBLRATIO 2747.2013 0.5960 1934.6272 405.8400 3.9281
LEVERAGE 5825.8715 0.8884 4549.7385 650.9020 2.7404
RURAL 60.3257 0.5222 43.4007 372.0200 0.1012
HHINCOME -0.0003 0.4906 -0.0003 358.7964 -0.0000
SMALLBUSREV 0.3504 0.5397 0.2504 379.6115 0.0006
HISPANIC -0.1865 0.4986 -0.1356 362.0805 -0.0003
ASIAN -1.5461 0.4980 -1.1248 361.8198 -0.0027
BLACK -0.2564 0.4762 -0.1887 352.9739 -0.0005
TRACTBRANCH 496.0456 0.5050 359.6317 364.7307 0.8621
MKTBRANCH 408.0078 0.5394 291.6047 379.4752 0.6607
Table 6
McDonald and Moffitt Decomposition of Marginal Effects for
Small Business Lending in MHI Areas
∂ Ey / ∂ Xi = F(z) [∂ Ey* / ∂ Xi] + Ey* [∂ F(z) / ∂ Xi]
Marginal Effect Decomposition
Variable ∂ Ey / ∂ Xi F(z) [∂ Ey* / ∂ Xi] Ey* [∂ F(z) / ∂ Xi]
SCORE 9.4031 0.5107 6.7991 342.4122 0.0173
LNASSETS 115.1619 1.0000 115.1512 1877.1036 0.0000
SBLRATIO 2897.0507 0.6064 2036.9253 383.3782 4.3347
LEVERAGE 4910.3456 0.8696 3763.2545 580.1228 2.8230
RURAL 40.8124 0.5237 29.3440 347.5876 0.0732
HHINCOME 0.0006 0.5317 0.0004 350.8230 0.0000
SMALLBUSREV 0.0948 0.5131 0.0685 343.3711 0.0002
HISPANIC -0.1200 0.4992 -0.0872 337.9323 -0.0002
ASIAN 1.1309 0.5018 0.8212 338.9562 0.0021
BLACK -0.2640 0.4929 -0.1926 335.5347 -0.0005
TRACTBRANCH 462.8727 0.5065 335.3350 340.7929 0.8598
MKTBRANCH 372.3795 0.5351 266.5579 352.1744 0.652422
References
Berger, Allen, Anil Kashyap, and Joseph Scalise.  “The Transformation of the U.S. Banking
Industry: What a Long, Strange Trip It∋ s Been.”  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.
Volume 0(2), 1995.  Pages 55-217.
Berger, Allen and Gregory Udell.  “Universal Banking and the Future of Small Business
Lending” in A. Saunders and I. Walter, eds., Financial System Design: The Case for Universal
Banking. Irwin Publishing: Homewood, IL, 1996.
Berger, Allen and Gregory Udell.  “Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm
Finance.”  Journal of Business. Volume 68(3), July, 1995. Pages 351-381.
Bostic, Raphael and Glenn Canner.  “New Information on Lending to Small Businesses and
Small Farms: The 1996 CRA Data.”  Federal Reserve Bulletin.  Volume 84(1), January, 1998.
Pages 1-21.
Cole, Rebel.  “The Importance of Relationships to the Availability of Credit.”  Journal of
Banking and Finance. Volume 22(6-8), August, 1998. Pages 959-977.
Cole, Rebel, Lawrence Goldberg, and Lawrence White.  “Cookie-Cutter Versus Character:  The
Micro Structure of Small Business Lending by Large and Small Banks.”  New York University,
Salomon Center Working Paper Number 99-12.23
Elliehausen, Gregory and John Wolken.  “Banking Markets and the Use of Financial Services by
Small and Medium-Sized Businesses.”  Federal Reserve Bulletin. Volume 76(10), October, 1990.
Pages 801-817.
Eisenbeis, Robert.  “Recent Developments in the Application of Credit Scoring Techniques to the
Evaluation of Commercial Loans.”  IMA Journal of Mathematics Applied in Business and
Industry.  Volume 7, 1996.  Pages 271-290.
Feldman, Ronald. “Small Business Loans, Small Banks and a Big Change in Technology Called
Credit Scoring.”  Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis’ The Region. September, 1997. Pages 19-
25.
Frame, W. Scott, Aruna Srinivasan, and Lynn Woosley.  “The Effect of Credit Scoring on Small
Business Lending.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking.  Forthcoming, 2001.
Frame, W. Scott. “FYI-Examining Small Business Lending in Bank Antitrust Analysis.”  Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s Economic Review. Volume 80(2), March/April, 1995. Pages 31-40.
Greene, William.  Econometric Analysis.  MacMillian Publishing Company: New York, 1997.
Ladd, Helen.  “Evidence on Discrimination in Mortgage Lending.  Journal of Economic
Perspectives.  Volume 12(2), Spring, 1998.  Pages 41-62.24
McDonald, John and Robert Moffitt.  “The Uses of Tobit Analysis.”  Review of Economics and
Statistics.  Volume 62, 1980.  Pages 318-321.
Mester, Loretta. “What’s the Point of Credit Scoring?”  Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s
Business Review. September/October, 1997. Pages 3-16.
Nakamura, Leonard. “Recent Research in Commercial Banking: Information and Lending.”
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper Number 93-24.
Petersen, Mitchell and Raghuram Rajan. “The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence
From Small Business Data.” Journal of Finance. Volume 49(1) March, 1994. Pages 3-37.
Rutherford, Reid. “Securitizing Small Business Loans: A Banker’s Action Plan.”  Commercial
Lending Review.  Volume 10(1), Winter 1994-95.  Pages 62-74.
Stiglitz Joseph and Andrew Weiss. “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information.”
American Economic Review. Volume 71(3), June, 1981. Pages 393-410.
Williamson, Oliver. “The Economics of Defense Contracting: Incentives and Performance” in R.
McKean, ed., Issues in Defense Economics.  Columbia University Press: New York, 1967.